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Abstract The epistemic future (e.g., the epistemic uses of English will) is often
analyzed on a par with epistemic must. We provide novel empirical evidence from
English and Romanian in deduction and factive contexts to argue that this identical
treatment is not warranted. We propose a unified solution based on novel ways to (i)
look at weakness in must and will and (ii) encode the factive presupposition when
the complement of the factive is a modalized proposition (an interaction that, to
our knowledge, has not been analyzed formally before). The account connects to
existing debates on strength in necessity modals, on epistemic future and future
tense, and on the embedding of epistemic (and other flavor) modals under attitudes.
Keywords: epistemic modals, epistemic future, deduction, factive cognitive attitudes
1 Introduction
Consider the English sentence in (1) below. In this sentence the auxiliary will can
have two interpretations. On one interpretation, will is understood as simply saying
that Anna’s being home is located after the time of utterance, and does not convey
any speaker uncertainty about the truth of the prejacent – the speaker believes it to be
true. This interpretation can be paraphrased as in (1a) and is essentially understood
as an expression of future temporality (FUT). On the other interpretation, will is
understood as saying that Anna’s being home is located at or after the time of
utterance and also conveys some speaker uncertainty about the truth of the prejacent
– the speaker believes it to be merely likely to be true, given what s/he knows. This
interpretation can be paraphrased as in (1b) and is essentially understood as an
expression of epistemic modality (EPI).
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(1) Anna will be home.
a. Anna is guaranteed to be home at some point in the future. FUT3
b. Anna is likely to be home now / at some point in the future, given what the
speaker knows. EPI3
The fact that a future temporal and an epistemic modal interpretation are obtained
through the same morphology is not an accident of English – it is indeed cross-
linguistically very common (see, e.g., Winans 2016 or Giannakidou & Mari 2018
for languages and references). Below we illustrate this with Romanian va, which,









‘Anna will be home.’ Romanian; FUT3, EPI3
For both English will and Romanian va the future temporal interpretation has
come to be the more dominant one, and the epistemic interpretation increasingly less
accessible (with variation across speakers or dialects). While in English this seems
to be leading to the epistemic future being phased out, in Romanian it has led to
the epistemic future acquiring a morphology of its own: o in (3) is morphologically









‘Anna will be home.’ Romanian; FUT7, EPI3
The future temporal interpretation of will and va is often referred to simply as
the ‘future tense’ and the epistemic modal interpretation of will, va, and o as the
‘epistemic future’. In this paper we focus on this latter epistemic future interpretation
only, aiming to explain how it compares to more canonical epistemic modals. Since
intuitions about this interpretation are less clear for the ambiguous will/va than for
the unambiguous o, in what follows we will throughout draw on all three forms.
The existing literature typically paraphrases the epistemic future (at least in
plain declaratives) as must (e.g., Condoravdi 2003 for English; Mihoc 2012; Fa˘la˘us,
2014 for Romanian; Fa˘la˘us, & Laca 2014 for Spanish; Ippolito & Farkas 2018 for
Romanian and Italian; Giannakidou & Mari 2016, 2018 for Greek and Italian).
These paraphrases have been used to argue for a fundamental similarity between the
two categories and have been fruitful in developing formal accounts of the epistemic
future (or of the future more generally) as an epistemic modal. At the same time,
it is also clear that this similarity doesn’t always hold – there are contexts where
epistemic must is fine and the epistemic future is not (e.g., Winans 2016; Fa˘la˘us,
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2014; Ippolito & Farkas 2018; etc.), and also contexts where the epistemic future
is fine and epistemic must is not (e.g., Mihoc 2012, 2014; Fa˘la˘us, 2014; Ippolito &
Farkas 2018, a.o.). In what follows we focus on two contrasts of the former type
(both noticed in Fa˘la˘us, 2014, without a formal treatment).
The first contrast between epistemic must and the epistemic future – to which
we will refer as THE CERTAINTY PUZZLE – has to do with acceptability in unem-
bedded environments, depending on speaker (un)certainty / (non-)deduction
(cf. Goodhue 2017 for a description of these contexts as (non-)deduction contexts).
In a context as below where the speaker is not entirely sure that the conclusion is
true / the conclusion doesn’t follow from the facts – if it is 7 pm and at 7 pm Anna is
typically home, that only makes it likely that she is home now, but doesn’t guarantee
it – both epistemic must and the epistemic future are felicitous.
(4) Unembedded, uncertainty context
Jo is looking for Anna. Jo checks the time: It’s 7 pm. Jo knows that at 7 pm
Anna is typically home. Jo concludes:
a. Anna must be home now.





























However, in a context as below where the speaker is entirely sure that the
conclusion is true / the conclusion does follow from the facts – if it is 7 pm and at 7
pm Anna is always home, that guarantees that she is home now – epistemic must
continues to be felicitous but the epistemic future is not. (Of course, always rarely
really means always in real life, but the point is that Jo takes it as such.)
(5) Unembedded, certainty context
Jo is looking for Anna. Jo checks the time: It’s 7 pm. Jo knows that at 7 pm
Anna is always home. Jo concludes:
a. Anna must be home now.





























The same can be seen, perhaps even more clearly, from a context as below:
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(6) If x is divisible by 2, then x is even. 2 is divisible by 2.
So, 2 3must / # will / # va / # o be even.
Similar contrasts are given in (7) (cf. von Fintel & Gillies 2010 for must, also used
in Fa˘la˘us, 2014 for Romanian o) and (8) ( cf. Mandelkern 2019: 248 on must, also
used in Ippolito & Farkas 2018 for the epistemic future):
(7) Chris has lost her ball, but she knows with full certainty that it is either in
Box A or B or C. She says: The ball is in A or in B or in C. It is not in A . . . It
is not in B . . .
So, it 3must / # will / # va / # o be in C.
(8) If the set of validities were decidable, then the halting problem would be
decidable. The halting problem is not decidable.
So, the set of validities 3must / # will / # va / # o be undecidable.
The second contrast between epistemic must and the epistemic future – to
which we will refer as THE FACTIVITY PUZZLE – has to do with embedding in the
complement of a cognitive attitude predicate, depending on (non-)factivity.
When embedded under a non-factive cognitive attitude predicate such as think,
guess, or suspect, both epistemic must and the epistemic future are fine.
(9) Embedded, complement of non-factive cognitive attitude
a. I think that Anna must be home now.





































However, when embedded under a factive cognitive attitude predicate such as
find out, epistemic must is fine whereas the epistemic future is not.
(10) Embedded, complement of factive cognitive attitude
a. I just found out that Anna must be home now.





















1 Some native speakers find this slightly degraded, but then agree that it improves if “Anna” is replaced
with a pronoun, if that is removed, and if contraction is used: I think she’ll be home now.
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The same happens with other factive cognitive attitude predicates, e.g., realize,
discover, know, which consistently rule out the epistemic future in their complement.
In order to account for these puzzles, we need to understand (i) why epistemic
must is compatible with both an uncertainty/non-deduction and a certainty/deduction
context whereas the epistemic future only with the former; and (ii) why epistemic
must is compatible with both a non-factive and a factive cognitive attitude, whereas
the epistemic future only with the former. The existing literature provides many
insights, yet a full explanation for all these facts is still missing. Our goal in what
follows is to argue that the two contrasts are related and to provide a unitary account,
which captures the distribution of must and the epistemic future in both unembedded
and embedded contexts. We offer a unified account, arguing that epistemic must and
the epistemic future are both epistemic necessity modals, but the former allows an
empty ordering source while the latter does not. We show that this straightforwardly
captures the certainty puzzle and, with existing assumptions about epistemic modal
embedding under attitude predicates and a novel view of the factive presupposition
of such predicates generalized for modalized complements, the factivity puzzle also.
2 Proposal: the certainty puzzle
The certainty puzzle concerns the fact that both epistemic must and the epistemic
future can be used in uncertainty/non-deduction contexts, but only epistemic must
can also be used in certainty/deduction contexts. Our proposed solution is as below.
2.1 Capturing the similarity in uncertainty/non-deduction contexts
On a simple view of modality, modals are interpreted relative to a conversational
background. The conversational background is a function f that assigns to a world
w the set of propositions encoding what is known (epistemic) / believed (doxastic) /
allowed (deontic) / etc. at w. The global intersection of these propositions,
⋂
f (w),
provides the set of worlds compatible with what is known/believed/allowed/etc.
at w. This set of worlds is what the modal quantifies over. Specifically, given an
evaluation world w, a possibility/necessity modal takes as an argument a conversa-
tional background f and a proposition p and yields true iff some/all the worlds in⋂
f (w) are worlds where p is true. In particular, an epistemic necessity modal takes
as an argument a conversational background f that assigns to w a set of propositions
encoding what is known at w, and a proposition p, and yields true iff all the worlds
in
⋂
f (w) are worlds where p is true.
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(11) JmustKw = λ f〈s,〈〈s,t〉t〉〉 .λ p〈s,t〉 .∀w′ ∈⋂ f (w)[p(w′)]
Note that, if f (w) are propositions that are true at w, that means that each of
them contains w, so their global intersection
⋂
f (w) also must. As a result, the truth
conditions, which guarantee that all the worlds in
⋂
f (w) are worlds where p is true,
guarantee that w itself is a world where p is true. Accordingly, must p entails p.
But, if must p entails p, we expect it to be stronger, or at least as strong, as p.
However, as Karttunen (1972) pointed out, this seems wrong – intuitions for an
utterance of p versus must p, cf. below, suggest that must p is, if anything, weaker.
(12) a. Anna is home.
b. Anna must be home. ← perceived to be weaker!
Karttunen suggested that this is because, contrary to what is predicted on a
simple view of modality, the truth of must p “in some way logically follows from
[. . . ] facts the speaker knows and some reasonable assumptions that he is willing to
entertain” (our emphasis; Karttunen 1972: 12, cited in Goodhue 2017: 3).
We believe Karttunen’s characterization captures our intuition about the uncer-
tainty context example as well. In this example, repeated below, the truth of must
p logically follows from the fact that it is 7 pm and the assumption (from a typical
fact) that if it is 7 pm then Anna is home.
(13) (= (4))
Jo is looking for Anna. Jo checks the time: It’s 7 pm. Jo knows that at 7 pm
Anna is typically home. Jo concludes:
Anna 3must / 3will / 3va / 3o be home now.
To capture facts like the above (and others), Kratzer (1981, 1991, 2012) proposed
an updated semantics of modals. On her view, epistemic modals (and other kinds
of modals) are interpreted relative to not one but two conversational backgrounds.
One is, as before, a modal base f which assigns to a world w propositions that are
(taken to be) true at w (epistemic modal base). As before, the global intersection
of these propositions,
⋂
f (w), provides a set of worlds that are compatible with all
the propositions that are (taken to be) true at w and which, for the reasons outlined
earlier, is a set that always contains w. However, this time quantification isn’t said
to happen over this whole set, but rather over a subset thereof, a set of worlds from⋂
f (w) judged best according to an additional conversational background g, known
as the ordering source, which assigns to a world w propositions that are believed
to be true at w / stereotypically true at w / reasonable assumptions at w. As before,
because of the epistemic nature of f , w is guaranteed to be in
⋂
f (w). However, it
is not guaranteed to be in the best subset of
⋂
f (w). Thus, on these updated truth
conditions, must p evaluated at w only guarantees that p is true in all the best worlds
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accessible from w, it does not guarantee that it is true at w itself. As a consequence,
must p no longer entails p.
We believe Kratzer’s approach captures the behavior of epistemic must and ex-
tends to the epistemic future. To be concrete, given a world of evaluation w, epistemic
must / the epistemic future in contexts like (13) have the following semantics:
First, they take as an argument a conversational background f which assigns to
w propositions true at w, f (w);
⋂
f (w) forms the epistemic modal base.
(14) f〈s,〈〈s,t〉t〉〉(w) = {p : p is (taken to be) true at w}
Thus,⋂
f (w) = {w : w is in every p in f (w)}
In our context, this would be the fact that it is 7 pm, a fact that strictly speaking, is
compatible both with Anna being home and with Anna not being home.
Second, they take as an argument a conversational background g which assigns
to w propositions that are stereotypically true / reasonable assumptions at w.
(15) g(w) = {p : p is a belief / stereotypical fact / reasonable assumption in w}
In our context, this would be the stereotypical fact that, if it is 7 pm, Anna is home.
This doxastic/stereotypical ordering source ranks the worlds in
⋂
f (w) (which are
worlds compatible with all the propositions (taken to be) true at w) according to how
well they measure up to the standard set by the propositions in g(w) (propositions
encoding what is assumed to be true at w) as shown below – a world v in
⋂
f (w) is
better than another such world v′ if the set of propositions from g(w) true in v is a
superset of the set of propositions from g(w) true in v′.
(16) ∀v,v′ ∈⋂ f (w) : v≤g(w) v′ iff {p : p∈ g(w)∧v∈ p}⊇ {p : p∈ g(w)∧v′ ∈ p}
In our context, if the worlds in
⋂
f (w) – worlds where it is 7 pm – include both
worlds where Anna is home and where Anna is not home, the effect of the ordering
source is that the first kind of worlds will rank higher.
Once the worlds in
⋂
f (w) are thus ordered by g(w), (cf. Portner 2009) an
additional function, Best, picks out the worlds that are ranked the highest, as below.
(17) Best(
⋂
f (w),g(w)) = {v ∈⋂ f (w) : ¬∃v′ ∈⋂ f (w) : v′ <g(w) v}
In our context, Best would pick out from f (w) – worlds compatible with the fact that
it is 7 pm – only those worlds that were ranked highest by ≤g(w) – that is, worlds
where Anna is home.
Third, and last, epistemic must / the epistemic future take as an argument their
prejacent p. They yield true iff all the worlds picked out by Best(
⋂
f (w),g(w)) are
worlds where p is true.
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(18) Jmust/[future]-EPIKw
= λ f〈s,〈〈s,t〉t〉〉 .λg〈s,〈〈s,t〉t〉〉 .λ p〈s,t〉 .∀w′ ∈ Best(
⋂
f (w),g(w))[p(w′)]
In our context, this amounts to saying that all the worlds in which it is 7pm is true
and in which if it is 7 pm, then Anna is home is true are worlds where Anna is home
is true. As mentioned earlier, for an epistemic necessity modal, w is guaranteed to
be in
⋂
f (w) – worlds where it is 7 pm. However, w is not guaranteed to be in the
Best subset of
⋂
f (w) – worlds where it is 7 pm and Anna is home. Thus, the truth
conditions above do not guarantee that p is true at w itself, which captures the use of
epistemic must and the epistemic future in the uncertainty context.
2.2 Capturing the contrast in certainty/deduction contexts
Kratzer (1981, 1991)’s ordering source was by design meant to weaken the modal
base – to make must p not entail p – and thus give rise to uncertainty along the
lines we described. But von Fintel & Gillies (2010) showed with examples like
the ones we saw in (5) that must is in fact perfectly compatible with a context
of certainty. They argued, against the Karttunen (1972)/Kratzer (1981) view of
must, that the difference between must p and p is not one of (lack of) strength –
(in)ability to entail p – but rather one of (in)directness – to utter must p at w, p
cannot already be one of the facts the speaker has direct access to.2 This raises the
question of how this approach handles our uncertainty contexts, which are explicitly
such that they do not entail p, yet an utterance of must p is perfectly fine. This case
is unexpected on the must p-entails-p view of must, yet it is perfectly expected on
the Karttunen (1972)/Kratzer (1981) must p-does-not-entail-p view of must that we
adopted. Is there, then, any way to capture the certainty context while maintaining
the explanation for the uncertainty context that we adopted above?
As it turns out, Kratzer’s approach has the potential not only for weakness
but also for strength. In particular, while she argues that “quite generally, the
interpretations of modals depend on both a modal base and an ordering source”,
she also allows that “either parameter can be filled by the empty conversational
background” (Kratzer 2012: 49). We believe this provides the solution to our
unembedded, certainty context case. In this context the facts entail p. Technically,
all the worlds in
⋂
f (w) are worlds in which p is true. As such, no extra assumptions
are needed to decide whether p. More concretely, since the whole purpose of g(w)
is to narrow
⋂
f (w) down to the p-worlds, if all the worlds in
⋂
f (w) are already
p-worlds, g(w) serves no purpose. We propose that this is a case where the ordering
2 See also Goodhue (2017) for a recent discussion of weakness (cf. Karttunen 1972; Kratzer 1981,
1991, 2012; Giannakidou & Mari 2018, a.o.) vs. indirectness (cf. von Fintel & Gillies 2010 a.o.),
and new arguments for the former.
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source is actually empty.3 If epistemic must allows an empty ordering source but
the epistemic future is lexically such that it disallows it – *g(w) = ∅ – then their
distribution in unemebedded contexts depending on certainty follows.4
2.3 Predictions and extensions
2.3.1 Prediction: must p vs. p
We know that must p is fine in both explicit uncertainty and explicit certainty
contexts, and we captured that by saying that it can be deduced from either
facts+assumptions or just facts. What about plain p? It would be odd to utter
it in the explicit uncertainty context but it is perfectly fine in the explicit certainty
contexts. We can capture this by saying that, when used to convey an inference, p
can only follow from (propositions taken to be) facts (consistent with a traditional
knowledge-based norm for assertion). The only difference between must p and p
in explicit certainty contexts might be that must p, by its modal meaning, makes
explicit reference to a modal base and thus signals the reasoning process overtly.
Consider now a context where the speaker sees water pouring from the sky and
concludes from this that it is raining. Traditionally, this context has been analyzed
as a context of certainty. Yet plain p is felicitous – It is raining! – but must p
is degraded – # It must be raining! Why is that? We believe this is actually a
context where reasoning is based on both a fact – that I see water pouring from
the sky – and an assumption – that if I see water pouring from the sky that means
that it is raining. However, this assumption about the significance of the fact is so
highly conventionalized that it is taken as a fact. This view makes two predictions:
First, must p (unlike p) should be acceptable for people who are more aware of the
assumption status and the fact that it may be wrong. This is confirmed by examples
like von Fintel & Gillies (2010)’s speaker who has been informed that there would be
a movie shooting involving fake rain. Second, must p (like p) should be acceptable
for people who take the assumption as a fact but want to keep track explicitly of this
added premise in their reasoning. This is confirmed by examples like von Fintel &
Gillies (2010)’s careful epistemologist. But so far we still predict only acceptability
for must p. Why then is it degraded? We think that a third possibility is that, due to
3 Another possibility is that g(w) is not empty but irrelevant – e.g., it might rank the worlds in
⋂
f (w)
w.r.t. whether p and some other proposition q is true or not in them. However, it is plausible to think
that f (w) and g(w) are sensitive to the question under discussion, which should rule this case out.
4 Another way to capture this in terms of different accessibility relations (Portner 2009; Kaufmann,
Condoravdi & Harizanov 2006): Both epistemic must and the epistemic future can associate with
Rfacts+assumptions, but only epistemic must can also associate with Rfacts. One possible disadvantage
with this approach is that we now have two lexical entries for epistemic must. A separate but related
issue will be pointed out in Fn. 8.
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its highly conventionalized status, the assumption is often conflated with the fact – if
I see water pouring from the sky, then it is raining and if it is raining, then I see water
pouring from the sky. Von Fintel & Gillies (2010) propose must p (unlike p) carries
a requirement5 that must p cannot be used if p is already entailed by any single
proposition in what they call the Direct evidence. We adopt this also, as follows:
with must p, p cannot be recognized as already part of f (w), i.e., p 6∈ f (w).
Finally, consider an utterance of p vs. must p in an out-of-the-blue context, such
as (12). Given our explanation for the certainty case in §2.2, our predictions for
out-of-the-blue contexts are now a bit more nuanced than on the plain Karttunen
(1972) view articulated in §2.1. In particular, for these contexts we predict that must
p doesn’t have to be understood as not entailing p – it can also be understood as
entailing p. This should depend on how the listener is willing to reconstruct the
speaker’s epistemic state – to a state as in our contexts of explicit uncertainty or to
one as in our contexts of explicit certainty. We believe this prediction, which is a
novel prediction with respect to the existing literature, is justified: if I ask Anna’s
secretary about her location and, after consulting her calendar, she tells me Anna
must be in Honolulu now, this does not have to be taken as an indication of ignorance
or uncertainty, it may also simply be taken as an explicit indication of reasoning.
However, in many everyday situations a listener may still be biased towards inferring
ignorance – so long as there are no relatively good reasons to infer certainty, it’s
always safer to infer uncertainty. Yet, even then, a listener can ask their interlocutor
either ‘Why are you uncertain?’ but also ‘How do you know that?’, which shows that
they don’t necessarily rule out the possibility that the speaker has facts that entail p.
2.3.2 Extension: must vs. the epistemic future in other contexts
We saw that both must p and [epistemic future] p were fine in explicit uncertainty
contexts. We captured this by saying that they are both compatible with conclusions
based on facts+assumptions. But this predicts that in this type of contexts they should
always be equivalent. Yet Ippolito & Farkas (2018) show that in a context such as
the one below, where the use of the modal can but doesn’t have to be reconstructed
to just facts, they are different – must p sounds reasonable but [epistemic future] p
sounds completely speculative and therefore unreasonable in the context.
(19) Maria has just given a very detailed description of her symptoms to her
doctor. When she finishes, the doctor says:
It 3must / # will / # va / # o be narcolepsy.
5 Given the cross-linguistic universality of this, von Fintel & Gillies (2010) suggest this might be a
quantity implicature. However, in the face of certain difficulties, they default to a presupposition
analysis, but in light of further implicature effects as those mentioned in §2.3.2, we believe a
implicature account might be more generally needed, or at least worth exploring.
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Ippolito & Farkas add to this an example with an explicitly clueless speaker as
below, where must p is out but [epistemic future] p is perfectly fine.
(20) I don’t have the slightest idea, he # must / 3will / 3va / 3o be home.
They conclude that epistemic must requires facts, but – contrary to its ‘epistemic’
label – the epistemic future does not: it can be based on no facts at all. (They in fact
conclude that the epistemic future is never based on facts. See discussion in §2.4.)
Our account in its present form doesn’t yet capture this, but we think there is
a plausible way to extend it. Just like in Kratzer (2012)’s system epistemic modal
reasoning is allowed in principle to be based just on facts – an empty ordering
source – it is also in principle allowed to be based just on assumptions – an empty
modal base.6 If the epistemic future allows an empty modal base and epistemic
must does not, this captures their contrast in the clueless speaker context. Moreover,
whenever, because of the use of the epistemic future, the context is reconstructed to
an uncertainty context, if the fact that the premises consist not just of assumptions but
also of facts is not made clear, then the context could in principle be reconstructed
to either just assumptions or both facts and assumptions. This ambiguity predicts
scalar implicature effects which, informally, might be described as follows: if the
context had been one of both facts and assumptions, the speaker would have used
must p, so the fact that s/he used [epistemic future] p must mean that the reasoning
was in fact based on just assumptions. This captures the speculative vibe of the
epistemic future in the doctor context. This moreover makes predictions for a use of
the epistemic future in out-of-the-blue contexts, where it can be reconstructed the
same way, to either just assumptions or to facts and assumptions. In either case it is
pitched against must, which can be reconstructed to either facts and assumptions or
just facts. This captures sequences as below (from Fa˘la˘us, 2014, originally shown
for Romanian), where the must p continuation is read as denying that the reasoning
is based on just assumptions or even on just facts and assumptions. The former is
a cancellation of a scalar implicature that not must p that effectively reconstructs
must p to facts and assumptions or just facts, and the latter a correction of the whole
[epistemic future] p assertion that effectively reconstructs must p to just facts.
(21) She will be home now. In fact, she must be home now.
2.4 Previous literature
There have been numerous separate accounts of epistemic must and the epistemic
future in the literature but considerably fewer accounts that have looked at them
together. We briefly review them below.
6 This would be a case where the set of worlds ordered by the ordering source are restricted by nothing
other than, possibly, the question under discussion – see also Fn. 3.
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Winans (2016) starts from contrasts between must and English will in uncertainty
contexts like The light is on. Typically, if the light is on, Anna is home. So, Anna must
/ # will be home. She notes that the difference between this context and a context
like our own It’s 7 pm. Typically, if it’s 7 pm, Anna is home. So, Anna must / will be
home. is that here the guess can be understood as the reason for the evidence – the
light is on because Anna is home – so the underlying reasoning schema is abductive.
She proposes that will carries an anti-abductivity requirement, which is responsible
for its restricted distribution. However, note that, by using time evidence in both our
uncertainty and one of our certainty examples, we deliberately avoided an abductive
reasoning schema – as Winans herself would say, the guess about Anna being home
is not the cause for it being 7 pm, so the reasoning here is not abductive. And it is
not clear at all that our other certainty examples are abductive either – e.g., 2 being
even doesn’t cause it to be divisible by 2, rather, being divisible by 2 is what causes
it to count as even. We conclude that our contrasts are not about anti-abductivity but
about whether the facts entail p, as our minimal pair in (4)-(5) also shows.
Ippolito & Farkas (2018) start from contrasts between must and the epistemic
future like the ones we saw in the doctor and the clueless speaker example earlier.
They take them to mean that the epistemic future is not in fact like epistemic
must, and go on to articulate an account on which the epistemic future is in fact
neither epistemic nor a necessity modal in the canonical sense – i.e., it is a universal
quantifier over most likely propositions, where likelihood is assessed based on what
is normally the case in the world of evaluation relative to a doxastic base. They
argue this captures both why the epistemic future seems similar to epistemic must –
this comes from an inference from what is likely to what the speaker believes – and
why it is incompatible with full knowledge and compatible with not having a clue –
this comes from the fact that it is not about knowledge. While this is a plausible way
to look at the data, we believe an account of the sort we sketched is preferable – it
not only offers a way to capture the contrasts but also to preserve existing insights
that can derive the similarities (e.g., about the cross-linguistic temporal-aspectual
similarity of the epistemic future to epistemic modals).
Finally, Giannakidou & Mari (2018) focus on the similarities between epistemic
must and the epistemic future in uncertainty contexts and analyze them as epistemic
necessity modals. In order to derive the incompatibility of the epistemic future with
certainty contexts, they argue that it presupposes that the modal base –
⋂
f (w) –
has to contain both p and non-p worlds. Note that this is essentially the same as
our proposal for the uncertainty context – on our view when the context is such that⋂
f (w) doesn’t entail p, and so it contains both p- and non-p-worlds, g(w) kicks in
to pick out a subset that does. However, we also leave room for certainty – when the
context is such that
⋂
f (w) does by itself entail p, and so it contains only p-worlds,
g(w) plays no role, it is empty. Accordingly, we have a way to capture the contrast
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between epistemic must and the epistemic future in certainty contexts, a contrast that
the authors do not discuss.
2.5 Summary
We have argued that epistemic must and the epistemic future are both epistemic
necessity modals whose quantificational domain is given by a modal base as restricted
by an ordering source. A non-empty ordering source derives uncertainty, and an
empty ordering source certainty. The epistemic future does not tolerate an empty
ordering source, capturing our certainty puzzle.
3 Proposal: the factivity puzzle
Our second puzzle, the factivity puzzle, has to do with the fact that both epistemic
must and the epistemic future can occur in the complement of a non-factive cognitive
attitude predicate, but only epistemic must can also occur in the complement of a
factive attitude predicate. We argue that the modal semantics we used to model
(un)certainty and account for the certainty puzzle can help us capture the interaction
of must and the epistemic future with the presupposition of a factive predicate also.
3.1 Capturing the similarity under non-factive cognitive attitudes
On a naive view of modal embedding under attitude predicates, the meaning of
the modal is relative to worlds accessible from worlds first made accessible by the
attitude predicate. For example, a sentence such as John believes it might be raining
should have the meaning below.
(22) John believes it might be raining.
∀w′ ∈ BELIEVEw, j∃w′′ ∈ Best(⋂ f(w′),g(w′))[p(w′′)]
Hacquard (2010: 105) however remarks that this sentence doesn’t seem to
have this meaning, rather, it “seems to make the more modest claim that rain
is compatible with what John believes.” She proposes that “epistemic modality
expresses possibilities/necessities given a particular information state, as determined
directly by the embedding attitude, rather than a hardwired knowledge/doxastic
state.”7 Concretely, this would mean that (22) must in fact be analyzed as below.
7 This assumption is also used to make sense of other puzzles related to modal embedding under
attitudes, e.g., Yalcin (2007)’s puzzle: Imagine that it’s raining but # it might not be. For more
discussion of this, see Hacquard (2010), Anand & Hacquard (2013) and references therein.
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(23) John believes it might be raining.
∀w′ ∈ BELIEVEw, j∃w′′ ∈ BELIEVEw,j[p(w′′)]
The first quantifier quantifies vacuously, so this simplifies to:
∃w′′ ∈ BELIEVEw, j[p(w′′)]
‘There is a world compatible with what John believes in which it is raining.’
We propose that our example where epistemic must and the epistemic future
appeared embedded in the complement of a cognitive attitude must be analyzed like
this as well, as shown below.
(24) I think that Anna 3must / 3will / 3va / 3o be home now. (= (9))
∀w′ ∈ THINKw,sp∀w′′ ∈ THINKw,sp[p(w′′)]
The first quantifier quantifies vacuously, so this simplifies to:
∀w′′ ∈ THINKw,sp[p(w′′)]
‘All the worlds compatible with what the speaker thinks are worlds in which
Anna is home.’
We argue that this extends to embedding of non-epistemic uses of must under a
cognitive attitude. We illustrate below for a deontic use of must.
(25) I think that Anna must pay a fine.
∀w′ ∈ THINKw,sp∀w′′ ∈ THINKw,sp[p(w′′)]
The first quantifier quantifies vacuously, so this simplifies to:
∀w′′ ∈ THINKw,sp[p(w′′)]
‘All the worlds compatible with what the speaker thinks are worlds in which
Anna pays a fine.’
The intuition behind this is as follows: even though, unembedded, ‘Anna must pay a
fine’ is about rules, once embedded under the cognitive attitude predicate it is about
knowledge/belief regarding the rules. More concretely, the speaker isn’t using facts
and laws to conclude deontically that must p, rather, s/he is using knowledge/beliefs
about facts and laws to conclude epistemic-doxastically that must p. Thus, the
underlying schema is not: Anna exceeded 40 mph. The law says that, if you exceed
40 mph, you pay a fine. Therefore, Anna must pay a fine. Rather, it is: I think that
Anna exceeded 40 mph. I think that, if you exceed 40 mph, you pay a fine. Therefore,
I think that Anna must pay a fine.
So the interpretation of epistemic/deontic/. . . must and of the epistemic future
under a cognitive attitude is done relative to the worlds introduced by that attitude.
We believe that for non-cognitive factives these are typically worlds compatible
with a mixture of facts and assumptions, but they could also be worlds compatible
with just facts or worlds compatible with just assumptions. A non-factive cognitive
attitude such as think (but also other non-factive cognitive attitudes, e.g., believe,
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etc.) essentially acts like an out-of-the-blue unembedded context, and we expect the
acceptability of must and of the epistemic future under think to be just in that case
also. More concretely, if think is reconstructed to both facts and assumptions, both
must and the epistemic future should be fine. As in unembedded contexts, this is the
safest default reconstruction, which captures the default acceptability of both under
think. However, if it is reconstructed to just facts, the epistemic future should be bad,
and (cf. our discussion of epistemic must vs. the epistemic future in the clueless
speaker contexts) if it is reconstructed to just assumptions, epistemic must should be
bad. This is borne out: when placed in a context like our well-defined uncertainty
and certainty contexts, which constrain exactly how think can be reconstructed, the
patterns are as in the unembedded case, as the reader can verify.
3.2 Capturing the contrast under factive cognitive attitudes
Factive cognitive attitude predicates are traditionally taken to entail the same as their
non-factive counterparts but to additionally presuppose the truth of their propositional
complement at the evaluation world (see, e.g., Abrusán 2014 or Spector & Egré 2015
for a recent endorsement of this view). For example, John knows that Anna is home
entails that John believes/thinks that Anna is home, and presupposes that she is.
(26) John knows that Anna is home.
a. Truth conditions: ∀w′ ∈ BELIEVE/THINKw, j[p(w′)]
b. Presupposition: p(w)
But this only provides a solution for the case where the complement of a factive
cognitive attitude is an unmodalized proposition. How does this transfer to our case
of interest where the complement of the factive cognitive attitude is a modalized
proposition? To our knowledge, the literature provides no answers.
We propose that, quite generally, a factive cognitive attitude predicate entails
truth relative to an epistemic-doxastic modal base like that of think, but presupposes
truth relative to a purely epistemic modal base. Concretely, we assume that, just
like know, find out entails the same as believe or think, and that the truth conditions
for the case with a must p or a will/va/o p complement are obtained as in (24).
Furthermore, we argue that the factive presupposition is obtained by replacing the
BELIEVE/THINK modal base from the truth conditions with a purely epistemic
modal base – essentially, our
⋂
f (w) from before, unrestricted by any g(w).
(27) I found out that Anna 3must / # will / # va / # o be home now. (= (5))
a. Truth conditions: ∀w′′ ∈ BELIEVE/THINKw,sp[p(w′′)]
b. Presupposition: ∀w′′ ∈⋂ f (w)w,sp[p(w′′)]
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Just as for think, we believe this works similarly for the embedding of other
flavors of must – I found out that Anna must pay a fine plausibly fits with a reasoning
schema of the form: I know/found out that if Anna exceeded 40 mph on this road,
then she pays a fine, and I know/found out that Anna exceeded 40 mphs on this road,
so I know/found out that she must pay a fine.
So the interpretation of epistemic/deontic/. . . must and of the epistemic future
under a factive cognitive attitude is, as for a non-factive cognitive attitude, relative to
the worlds introduced by that attitude predicate. However, unlike a non-factive, a
factive cognitive attitude also imposes a requirement that the context must be such
that the facts entail p. That effectively means that a modal under a factive cognitive
attitude is interpreted like a modal under a non-factive cognitive attitude presented
in a certainty context, which, as discussed, is itself like a modal in an unembedded,
certainty context. The contrast between epistemic must and the epistemic future then
follows for the same reasons as in the latter context – the epistemic future does not
allow a use where the facts already entail p, that is, a context where g(w) is empty /
where assumptions play no role.8
3.3 Predictions
3.3.1 Prediction: know must p vs. know p
Our account calls us to revisit know p – it has the same truth conditions as before,
but a slightly different presupposition, and as such is now identical to know must p.
(28) John knows that Anna is home.
a. Truth conditions: ∀w′ ∈ BELIEVE/THINKw, j[p(w′)] (= (26a))
b. Presupposition: ∀w′ ∈⋂ f (w)w, j[p(w′)] (6= (26b), = (27b))
Just as in unembedded contexts, we argue that the difference is that must p, and
because of it know must p, requires p 6∈ f (w).
3.3.2 Prediction: know must p vs. know might p
Our account also makes predictions with respect to epistemic possibility modals.
Concretely, we predict that know might p should presuppose that the epistemic state
of the speaker is compatible with the truth of p.
8 Another way to capture this in terms of accessibility relations: Non-factive cognitive attitudes can
associate with Rassumptions/facts+assumptions/facts but factive cognitive attitudes can only associate with
Rfacts. The embedded modal must match this relation (must quantify over the same worlds), yet only
epistemic must can associate with Rfacts (as discussed in Fn. 4), capturing the contrast. An issue we
see with this approach is that, by building the factive presupposition of the factive cognitive attitude
directly into the accessibility relation, it yields a meaning that is too weak under negation.
366
Epistemic modals, deduction, and factivity
(29) John found out that Anna might be home.
a. Truth conditions: ∃w′′ ∈ THINKw, j[p(w′′)]
b. Presupposition: ∃w′′ ∈⋂ f (w)w, j[p(w′′)]
The presupposition of might p thus generated seems to capture the correct meaning.
Note also that it is much weaker, and so more easily satisfiable, than that of must
p. This ties in nicely with cross-linguistic observations that existential epistemic
modals embed more easily than universal epistemic modals (cf. Papafragou 2006,
Rett 2012 for English; Anand & Hacquard 2013 for Romance languages).
3.4 Previous literature
To our knowledge, there has been little descriptive discussion and no formal analy-
sis of the epistemic future in the complement of (non-)factive cognitive attitudes.
However, there have been attempts to look at the embedding of epistemic modals
under attitudes in general. We touch on a few recent views below.
Papafragou (2006) discusses embedding of epistemic modals under emotive
factives and argues that the acceptability of must depends on whether it can be inter-
preted objectively (felicitous) vs. subjectively (infelicitous). Rett (2012) however
points out that might can also be either subjective or objective, yet that doesn’t
affect its felicity in these contexts, as it is always fine. She also shows that the
contexts where epistemic must seemed to be fine only on what Papafragou called an
‘objective’ meaning were also cases where epistemic will was out. Our account can
nicely capture these observations: on our view felicity depends on (a) objectivity – in
the sense of entailment from facts; and (b) quantificational force – in the sense that
for necessity modals the presupposition of a factive ends up being much stronger
than for possibility modals, which, as we argued, might affect ease of embedding;
but also (c) further differences between modals of the same force.
Anand & Hacquard (2013) and Crnic (2014) discuss contrasts between epistemic
possibility and necessity modals in the complement of various types of attitudes
but not in the complement of cognitive factives. Since we are looking to derive
differences within necessity modals and under factives, these accounts are not directly
applicable. However, we pursue a similar approach – all these attitudes have some
presupposition that goes through for some modals but not others, so our account
belongs to the same general approach to epistemic modal embedding.
3.5 Summary
We have argued that the embedded use of epistemic must and the epistemic fu-
ture under (non-)factive attitudes corresponds exactly to their unembedded use in
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(un)certainty/(non-)deduction contexts, and the same solution captures both.
4 Conclusion and outlook
Traditional intuitions that the epistemic future is fundamentally similar to epistemic
must have been challenged by cross-linguistic data showing important empirical
contrasts between the two. We discussed two such contrasts having to do with use
in (un)certainty/(non-)deduction and (non-)factive cognitive contexts. We provided
a solution on which the epistemic future and epistemic must are both epistemic
necessity modals sensitive to a modal base and an ordering source, but differ in
whether they allow an empty ordering source or not. We showed how, combined
with a certain view of factive cognitive attitudes, this account captures both contrasts.
Our contrastive discussion of epistemic must vs. the epistemic future used mainly
data in English and Romanian. To our knowledge, the certainty and the factivity
puzzles are attested in other languages with an epistemic future, e.g., Italian or
Spanish, but at this stage, the cross-linguistic extent of this behavior remains a matter
of further empirical investigation.
The account we proposed also makes contributions beyond these starting puzzles.
First, we contribute to debates on weak vs. strong epistemic must. We argue that
epistemic must is in fact underspecified with respect to strength, as by default allowed
by its semantics. This connects to, and improves on, recent work by Goodhue (2017).
Second, we contribute to debates on epistemic future vs. future tense. Since
[epistemic future] p cannot entail p, we encoded this as a lexical requirement on
[epistemic future]. However, [future tense] p can entail p, as shown by the fact
that (i) it is perceived as a lie if p is false at the designated future time (e.g., I will
come to visit is a lie if I don’t; cf. Comrie 1989: 53, cited in Salkie 2010); (ii) it
is felicitous in our certainty and factive contexts, in contrast to [epistemic future]
p. This suggests that, even on a unified analysis of epistemic future and future
tense under a single epistemic modal meaning, we must still recognize two slightly
different lexical variants, i.e., one that doesn’t allow an empty ordering source and
one that does. This connects to, though also challenges, (Giannakidou & Mari 2018).
Third, we contribute to debates regarding the embedding of epistemic modals
under attitudes. We have shown that differences can arise, and must be derived, not
just between possibility and necessity modals but between various types of necessity
modals also. This connects to, though potentially also challenges, recent approaches
such as (Anand & Hacquard 2013) and (Crnic 2014).
Overall, we hope to have shown that investigating the epistemic future alongside
more canonical epistemic modals, in both embedded and unembedded contexts, is a
fruitful way to breathe new life into old discussions, not only of epistemic modality
but also of other related phenomena.
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